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Abstract
Religious freedom, among other human rights, has increasingly
been restricted in Russia and Central Asia. Recent empirical research
has shown that increased governmental regulation of religion causes
increased social hostilities over religion and has shown the
connections between religious freedom and numerous other civil
rights and social goods. The U.S. government has particularly
recognized the importance of religious freedom in Russia, mandating
significant restrictions on aid based on the Russian interpretation of
restrictive religion legislation passed in 1997. Since that time,
however, virtually no attention has been given to draft legislation in
this area in Russia and common trends seen in religion laws in Russia
and Central Asia. This Article fills this gap by analyzing recent laws
and draft laws in Russia and moderate Central Asian countries, many
of which are unavailable in English. The Article provides context for
the increasingly restrictive religion laws in this region, and then
analyzes key provisions, evaluating them with regard to international
norms on freedom of religion and speech.

Religious freedom, among other human rights, has increasingly been
restricted in Russia and Central Asia. While the collapse of the Soviet
Union generally accompanied liberal laws allowing for broad
manifestations of freedom of religion,2 recent years have witnessed a
1
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significant reduction of those freedoms in Russia and Central Asia.
Restrictive laws and draft laws, previously seen only in the more
repressive parts of Central Asia, such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan,3
have increasingly appeared in more liberal Central Asian countries and
Russia.4 Over the last two years alone, the comparatively liberal Central
Asian countries of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic have introduced
religious censorship,5 banned or heavily regulated proselyting,6 raised
requirements to obtain legal entity status,7 and created other obstacles to
manifestations of religious freedom.8 Russia has proposed legislation
that mirrors some of the problematic provisions found in Central Asian
legislation.9
This Article provides both context for these troubling developments
and an analysis of the legislative trends restricting religious freedom in
this region, evaluating them against international norms protecting
freedom of religion or belief. Legislation is an important basis for and
indicator of government restrictions on religious freedom. While
legislation is not the only basis for government restrictions—this region
has also been plagued with unwritten regulations,10 stemming from the
lack of a strong basis in rule of law, and arbitrary enforcement of

12 of Apr. 23, 1991, VVR 1991, issue 25, page 284 (Ukraine), available on-line at
http://www.religlaw.org/document.php?DocumentID=1764.
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2011 Kazakh Law, Art. 8; 2009 Kyrgyz Law, Art. 5.
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http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010/148912.htm.
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seemingly liberal laws11—legislation nevertheless is a key element in
tracking the level of freedom in a country. Empirical research has also
shown that higher regulation of religion results in the abuse and
displacement of people based on their religious affiliation.12 Higher
governmental restrictions on religious groups have been shown to
increase persecution and social hostility towards them as well.13
Religious freedom has also been empirically shown to correlate with
other fundamental freedoms, such as civil and political rights, media and
speech rights, as well as with the longevity of democracy. 14 Statistical
studies suggest that increased religious competition leads to increased
religious social participation, which increases social capital and brings
tangible benefits such as fewer incidents of armed conflict, better levels
of health, higher earned income, and better educational opportunities for
women.15
Examining legislative trends affecting religious freedom in Russia
and Central Asia is particularly significant not only because of the wide
block of the world’s population affected,16 but also because of the
region’s significance as a positive or negative model for others. Eastern
European revolutions took place approximately twenty years before the
Arab Spring and affected, among other countries, the predominantly
Islamic countries of Central Asia. Looking at Russia and Central Asia
twenty years on may provide some helpful comparisons and warnings for
countries currently experiencing rapid democratic change.

11
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Id. at 4-7.
16
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Russia in particular is also the subject of significant international
scrutiny. In the past, restrictive religion legislation in Russia has led to
strong international reactions. Its restrictive and discriminatory 1997 law
on religious associations,17 for example, led to the U.S. Smith
Amendments in 1998, which tied foreign aid payments to Russia to its
implementation of laws such as the 1997 law in ways that do not
discriminate among religions.18 This amendment is still in force.19

I.

Context of Negative Legislative Trends

Putting current negative legislation in context is crucial. The
attitudes and policies leading to current restrictive legislation have been
significantly affected by recent experiences and political trends in this
region. In part, recent legislation can be seen as a reaction by dominant
religious traditions to the early openness after the fall of the Soviet
Union. Restrictive legislation has also been influenced in part by global
concerns of terrorism and religious extremism. Perhaps most
significantly, however, legislation restricting religious freedom in Russia
and Central Asia is part of a broader push to limit civil society and
centralize power under a strong political leader.
A. Pushback from Dominant Religious Traditions
17
“On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, Federal Law No. 125-FZ
(September 26, 1997), available at http://www.religlaw.org/document.php?DocumentID=72
[hereinafter “1997 Russian Religion Law” or “1997 Law”].
18
The legislation was originally tied to non-passage of the 1997 Religion Law, but eventually was
modified to align sanctions with the implementation of Russia’s religion law. Foreign Operations,
Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1998 § 577(a), Pub. L. No. 105-118, 11
Stat. 2386, 2433-34 (1997) (no foreign aid unless the President certifies that Russia “has implemented
no statute, executive order, regulation or similar government action that would discriminate, or would
have as its principal effect discrimination, against religious groups or religious communities in the
Russian Federation in violation of accepted international agreements on human rights and religious
freedoms to which the Russian Federation is a party.”). For a discussion of the Smith Amendments
and other international protest against Russia’s 1997 religion law, see W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Lauren
Homer, Russia’s 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations: An Analytical
Appraisal, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 101, 108–110 (1998).
19
Note that in 2010 and 2011, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has called
on the U.S. government to implement the Smith amendments because of deteriorating religious
freedom conditions in Russia. See Russia 2011 Chapter Summary, in U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 2011 ANNUAL
REPORT, available at http://www.uscirf.gov/government-relations/other-advocacy-materials/3387russia-.html; U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 272–87, available at
http://www.uscirf.gov/images/annual%20report%202010.pdf.
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At the time the Soviet Union collapsed, laws affecting religion
were significantly liberalized. Russia and Ukraine adopted extremely
liberal religion laws in 1990-1991.20 The Ukrainian law is still in force
and its provisions remain among the most liberal in the post-Soviet
world: religious organizations may gain legal entity status with only ten
members and there are no restrictions on proselyting and no forms of
censorship.21
In the late 1990s, countries in Eastern Europe saw a reaction
against earlier openness.22 Concerns were raised that traditional
religions, decimated under Communist regimes, were unable to compete
with newer, foreign-funded organizations.23 Dominant religious
traditions sought to use state power to limit minority religions and
schismatic or breakoff groups, such as non-traditional Orthodox or
Muslim groups which were not part of national hierarchies.24
In Moldova, for example, the state, because of national foreign
policy, long refused to register an Orthodox community which sought to
be under the Romanian Orthodox patriarch instead of the Russian
Orthodox patriarch.25 Russia has denied visas to prominent foreign
20

Law of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic on Freedom of Worship, ReligLaw, 25
Oct. 1990, available at http://www.religlaw.org/document.php?DocumentID=74; On the Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Organizations VIDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOYI RADY UKRAYINY [VVR] 1991,
Issue 25, page 283 (Ukraine); enacted under Resolution of the Supreme Council No. 988-12 of Apr.
23, 1991, VVR 1991, issue 25, page 284 (Ukraine), available on-line at
http://www.religlaw.org/document.php?DocumentID=1764.
21
On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations VIDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOYI RADY
UKRAYINY [VVR] 1991, Issue 25, page 283 (Ukraine); enacted under Resolution of the Supreme
Council No. 988-12 of Apr. 23, 1991, VVR 1991, issue 25, page 284 (Ukraine), available on-line at
http://www.religlaw.org/document.php?DocumentID=1764; see also JULY-SEPTEMBER, 2010
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, UKRAINE, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR (Sept. 13, 2011), available at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168344.htm.
22
See, e.g., John Witte, Jr., Introduction—Soul Wars: The Problem and Promise of Proselytism in
Russia, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 1 (Winter 1998).
23
See, e.g., id.; Dimitry V. Pospielovsky, Russian Orthodox Church in the Postcommunist CIS, in
in THE POLITICS OF RELIGION IN RUSSIA AND THE NEW STATES OF EURASIA 41, 55–6 (Michael
Bourdeaux ed., 1995); Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls (John Witte, Jr.
and Michael Bourdeaux, eds., 1999).
24
See, e.g., Marat S. Shterin & James T. Richardson, Effects of the Western Anti-Cult Movement
on Development of Laws Concerning Religion in Post-Communist Russia, 42 J. OF CHURCH & STATE
247, 249 (2000); JOHN GORDON GERRARD, RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY RESURGENT: FAITH AND POWER IN
THE NEW RUSSIA 172–176 (2008); Pospielovsky, supra note 23, at 56-61.
25
See Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (13 Dec. 2001).
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leaders of minority groups.26 In some countries, government leaders used
their power or influence to support one of various leaders of Muslim
groups.27
In Russia, favoritism of dominant religious groups was a major
factor leading to the more restrictive 1997 religion law.28 This
controversial law significantly increased requirements for legal entity
status. In order to have legal entity status nationally, a religious
association needed to either have three local organizations or to have
been in the country fifteen years or more.29 Given that meaningful
religious freedom protections in Russia had only been in place six
years,30 this created significant limitations on minority groups. Although
it did not on its face create a multi-tiered cooperation system like those of
many European countries,31 the 1997 law had a preamble “recognizing
the special role of Orthodoxy in the history of Russia and in the
establishment and development of its spirituality and culture; respecting
Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, and other religions, constituting
an integral part of the historical heritage of the peoples of Russia . . .”32
This preamble has been the slim legal basis for a series of separate state
agreements with the Orthodox.33 As a practical matter, Russia has
developed a system of cooperation with the Russian Orthodox Church,

26

See, e.g., Nolan and K. v. Russia, App. No. 2512/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (12 Feb 2009); Geraldine
Fagan, Russia: Moscow Chief Rabbi returns, but expulsion explanations are contradictory, FORUM 18,
19 Dec 2005, available at http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=706; Geraldine Fagan,
Russia: Religious work visa respite? FORUM 18, 3 May 2006, available at
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=773.
27
See Russia’s Muslims: Facing Extreme Prejudice, THE ECONOMIST, 8 May 2003; see also
Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96 (26 Oct. 2000).
28
Russia 1997 Law; INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2003: RUSSIA, SECTION II:
STATUS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, available at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2003/24430.htm.
29
Russia 1997 Law, Art. 8.
30
Russia 1990 Law.
31
See, e.g., GERHARD ROBBERS, STATE AND CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (1996); W. Cole
Durham, Jr., A Comparative Framework for Analyzing Religious Liberty, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN
RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1 (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, eds.,
1996); W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & BRETT SCHARFFS, LAW AND RELIGION: NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL,
AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (2010).
32
Russia 1997 Law, Preamble.
33
See Geraldine Fagan, Russia: Orthodox Becoming First Among Equals, FORUM 18 (May 27,
2003), available at http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=64.
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ignoring the 1997 law and Russian constitutional demands that religious
organizations are “separate from the state and equal before the law.”34
B. Concerns of Extremism
Another significant factor leading to contemporary restrictive
legislation is the rise of concerns about violent action from extremist
Islamic groups. After the events of September 11, 2001 and subsequent
terrorist attacks, a wave of anti-extremism and anti-terrorism legislation
was passed in a number of countries, including Russia.35 Extremism
concerns have continued to hit home in Russia with the increasing
radicalization of the situation in Chechnya,36 the Beslan school hostage
crisis in 2004,37 and the Moscow Metro suicide bombings in 2010.38
Although Russia has certainly been facing violence fueled by religious
extremism, it has increasingly turned to anti-extremism legal measures to
also limit unpopular religious groups rather than to merely address
groups associated with violent behaviors.
The definition of extremism in the Russian Anti-Extremism law,
passed in 2002, defines extremist activity inter alia as “forcible change of
the foundations of the constitutional system and violation of the integrity
of the Russian Federation; public justification of terrorism and other

34
1997 Law, Article 4.1; Constitution (Russia), Art. 14 (1. The Russian Federation shall be a
secular state. No religion may be instituted as state-sponsored or mandatory religion. 2. Religious
associations shall be separated from the state, and shall be equal before the law.).
35
See, e.g., 2001 PATRIOT Act, Pub.L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); Federal Law “On
combating extremist activity); No. 114-FZ (25 July 2002) (as amended 27 July 2006, 10 May and 24
July 2007 and 29 April 2008) (Russia), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2012/CDLREF(2012)012-e.pdf; Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/24/contents. Cf. Geraldine Fagan, Russia: How the Battle
with “Religious Extremism” Began, FORUM 18 (April 27, 2009), available at
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1287.
36
See, e.g., Russia’s Unruly North Caucasus: Islam Inflamed, THE ECONOMIST (7 Apr. 2011)
available at http://www.economist.com/node/18530091; Geraldine Fagan, Russia: Southern Muslims
Complain of Fall-Out from Anti-Terrorist Moves, FORUM 18 (Nov. 1, 2004), available at
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=442 (detailing what has been reported as Russia’s
“negative policy towards all Muslims” since the start of the second Chechen conflict.).
37
Insurgents Seize School in Russia and Hold Scores, N. Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2004); Geraldine
Fagan, Russia: Muslims Reject Hizb ut-Tahir Membership Changes, FORUM 18 (Apr. 18, 2006),
available at http://forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=761 (focusing on foundationless persecution of
Muslims after the Beslan hostage crisis).
38
Chechen Rebel Says He Ordered Moscow Metro Attacks, BBC NEWS (Mar. 31, 2010), available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8597792.stm.
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terrorist activity.”39 The Russian government, however, appears to read
this extremely broadly in practice. In 2000, for example, a Russian
federal policy statement on national security was amended by
presidential decree to state that “[e]nsuring the national security of the
Russian Federation also includes the protection of its ... spiritual and
moral heritage ... the forming of a State policy in the field of spiritual and
moral education of the population ... and also includes opposing the
negative influence of foreign religious organisations and missionaries
...”40
The law also is open to abuse against religious groups because of
its broad definition of extremist actions -- it lists “propaganda of the
exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of
their . . .religious . . . affiliation or attitude to religion” as extremism.41
Since many religious traditions affirm their superiority to others, this
definition cuts an extremely broad swath and can easily be used in a
discriminatory fashion.
Dozens of extremism investigations and prosecutions have been
brought against minority religious groups in recent years, particularly
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Russian Orthodox Old Believers, and followers of
Turkish theologian Said Nursi.42 Over one thousand publications have
been banned as extremist,43 including Jehovah’s Witness magazines, and

Federal Law “On combating extremist activity) No. 114-FZ (25 July 2002) (as amended 27 July
2006, 10 May and 24 July 2007 and 29 April 2008) (Russia), Art. 1(1) available at
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2012/CDL-REF(2012)012-e.pdf; see also Brian Gross, Russia’s War
on Political and Religious Extremism: An Appraisal of the Law ‘On Counteracting Extremist Activity,’
BYU L. REV. 717 (2003);The Structure of Russian Anti-Extremist Legislation, EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT SOVA CENTER FOR INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS (Nov. 2010), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/droi/dv/201/201011/20101129_3_10s
ova_en.pdf.
40
Case of Nolan and K. v. Russia, Application no. 2512/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (12 February 2009),
para. 12 (citing Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation (1997), as amended 10 January
2000 by Presidential Decree No. 24.)
41
Federal Law “On combating extremist activity) No. 114-FZ (25 July 2002) (as amended 27 July
2006, 10 May and 24 July 2007 and 29 April 2008) (Russia), Art. 1(1), available at
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2012/CDL-REF(2012)012-e.pdf,
42
A list of extremist organizations banned by Russian courts is available on-line at
http://www.sova-center.ru/misuse/docs/2007/11/d11927/.
43
A list of materials deemed extremist by Russian courts and listed by the Russian federal
government is available on-line at http://www.minjust.ru/nko/fedspisok . Additional documents that
have been banned by Russian courts but are not on the federal list are available on-line at
http://www.sova-center.ru/misuse/docs/2009/12/d17655/.
39
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attempts were made to ban the The Baghavad Gita as It Is.44 The antiextremism law has not only been used against religious organizations, but
also against civil society organizations generally,45 as well as those
publicly expressing disrespect for mainstream Russian Orthodoxy.46
The Russian Supreme Court raised concerns about extremism
prosecutions, and issued a resolution in 201147 reiterating constitutional
and international protections of human rights. Among other provisions, it
made clear that extremism offenses require “direct intent to stir up hatred
or hostility, and debased the person or group of persons on grounds of
sex, race, nationality, language, origin, religion, membership of a social
group.”48 It also made clear that criticism of others’ beliefs, including
religious beliefs, do not fall under the legal rubric of extremism:
“Under the actions aimed at inciting hatred or hostility, it should be
understood, in particular, the statements justifying and/or affirming
genocide, mass arrests, deportations, committing other illegal acts,
including the use of violence against members of a nation, race,
adherents of a religion, and other groups. Criticism of political
institutions, ideological and religious associations, political,
ideological or religious beliefs, national or religious identity is not in
itself to be regarded as an act aimed at inciting hatred or enmity.”49
Felix Corley, Russia: Has the “Madness” of Banning Religious Publications been Stopped?,
FORUM 18 (January 5, 2012), available at http://forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1652.
45
See, e.g., Daira Shuchalina, Syktyvkar, Maxim Ivanov, “’Memorial’ obvinili vo vsekh
ekstremistkikh grekhakh,” Kommersant No.8 (4793) (19 Jan 2012) (Regional FSB head accusing
human-rights organization of extremism for protesting presidential elections) (available on-line at
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc-y/1853724); Dmitry Florin, “’Sova’: delo protiv zhurnalistok,
obvinyayemykh v ekstrimizme iz-za stati o deportatsii kavskazskikh narodov, nepravomerno,”
Kavkazskii Uzel (13 Jan. 2011), available at http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/179574/ (detailing
case of journalists prosecuted for extremism for their coverage of the deportation of ethnic groups from
the Caucuses).
46
Two prominent Moscow art curators were fined over $10,000 over an exhibit that involved
parody of a famous icon, although those vandalizing the exhibit were not charged with anything.
Sophia Kishkovsky, Organizers of Art Show Convicted in Moscow, N. Y. TIMES (12 July 2010),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/arts/design/13curators.html; Alexander Verkhovsky,
Commentary: Russia: Art Curators’ Verdict Not Isolated Instance—This is a System, FORUM 18 (19
July 2010), available at http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1468. Two “punk-feminist”
protesters in the Moscow Church of Christ the Savior, the main Moscow cathedral, were arrested for
extremism for a “punk prayer” and held without bail. Kevin O’Flynn, Pussy Riot vs Vladimir Putin:
The Feminist Punk Band Jailed for Cathedral Protest, THE GUARDIAN (10 March 2012), available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/11/putin-russia-president-election-protests.
47
Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 11, “On judicial
practice in criminal cases involving extremism crimes” (29 June 2011), available at http://www.sovacenter.ru/misuse/docs/2011/06/d21988/.
48
Id. § 8.
49
Id. § 7.
44
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Russian human right commentators, however, have expressed “doubts
that [the Supreme Court’s resolution] will bear immediate fruit. So far,
we see that regional courts are simply ignoring the Supreme Court's
directions.”50
Concerns of extremism have also fueled restrictive government
reactions in Central Asia, not unsprisingly, given its comparatively close
geographic proximity to Afghanistan. In Tadjikistan, for example, the
resistance group in the civil war fought between 1992 and 1997 called
itself the Islamic Resistance Party, although it disavowed theocratic
fundamentalism and allied itself with reformist secular nationalists and
less orthodox Muslims.51 Many Central Asians have been fighting along
with the Taliban in Afghanistan and have a formed an Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan with an avowed goal of recreating an Islamic caliphate and
some small numbers of jihadist groups have been infiltrating Tajikistan
from Afghanistan and passing on to other Central Asian countries.52
Despite some real threats, in Central Asia, as in Russia, extremism has
largely been used as a convenient label to put down religious
minorities—“the region’s governments find the existence of an Islamic
threat quite useful in justifying their authoritarian behavior.”53 In many
cases, problems have arisen from ineffective governance, the narcotics
trade, ethnic divisions, or political dissent. For example, while the
Kyrgyz government blamed the 2010 violence against ethnic Uzbeks on
external groups and Islamic militants, “the pogroms in fact involved
many forces, from the remnants of the Bakiyev political machine to
prominent mainstream politicians and organised crime, especially the
narcotics trade.”54
C. Centralization of Power
50
Sova-Center Report, Misuse of Anti-Extremism Legislation in the First Half of 2011, available
at http://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/reports-analyses/2011/10/d22796/.
51
Qadi Akbar Turajonzoda, Religion: The Pillar of Society, in CENTRAL ASIA: CONFLICT
RESOLUTION, AND CHANGE 269 (Roald Z. Sagdeev and Susan Eisenhower, eds. 1995); ADEEB
KHALID, ISLAM AFTER COMMUNISM: RELIGION AND POLITICS IN CENTRAL ASIA149 (2007).
52
Crisis Group International, Tadjikistan: The Changing Insurgent Threats, ASIA REPORT NO. 205
(24 May 2011), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/205tajikistan-the-changing-insurgent-threats.aspx.
53
KHALID, supra note 51, at 142; see also T. Jeremy Gunn, Shaping an Islamic Identity: Religion,
Islamism, and the State in Central Asia, 64 SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 389 (2003).
54
Crisis Group International, The Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan, ASIA REPORT NO. 193 (23 Aug. 2010) ,
available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/193-the-pogroms-inkyrgyzstan.aspx.
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Religion politics in Russia and Central Asia have also been
significantly influenced by attempts to consolidate government power.55
The slide to authoritarianism in Russia under Putin has been widely
noted.56 Central Asia, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, has likewise
been under the control of ex-Soviet dictators.57 Civil society groups of
all types have faced limitations and harassment.58 For example, Russia
passed a restrictive law on NGOs in 200659 and has regularly initiated
prosecutions and investigations of independent political figures and
journalists.60 State pressure is applied to groups and individuals seen as
threats to its centralized control.
In Russia, this centralization of power has accompanied an attempt to
reestablish regional dominance.61 After the fall of the Soviet Union,
Russian citizens have increasingly resented their loss of international
importance. Russia has turned to Central Asia,62 establishing the
55

See, e.g., Chris Hann & Mathijs Pelkmans, Realigning Religion and Power in Central Asia:
Islam, Nation-State and (Post)Socialism, 61 EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES 1516–41 (Nov. 2009),; JAMES T.
RICHARDSON, REGULATING RELIGION-CASE STUDIES FROM AROUND THE GLOBE (2004).
56
See, e.g., Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, The Myth of the Authoritarian Model:
How Putin’s Crackdown Holds Russia Back, 87 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 68 (2008); Larry Diamond, The
Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State, 87 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 36 (2008); Ivan
Krastev, Democracy’s ‘Doubles’ 17 J. OF DEMOCRACY 52 (Apr. 2006).
57
Make a new plan, Stans, THE ECONOMIST (17 Dec. 2011), available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21541844; PAULINE JONES LUONG, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
POLITICAL CONTINUITY IN POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: POWER, PERCEPTIONS, AND PACTS (2004);
ERIC MAX MCGLINCHEY, PAYING FOR PATRONAGE: REGIME CHANGE IN POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA
(2003).
58
World Report 2012: Russia, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, available at http://www.hrw.org/worldreport-2012/world-report-2012-russia; HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (RUSSIA) U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (2010)
available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/eur/154447.htm; CHARLES BUXTON, THE
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY IN CENTRAL ASIA (2011); U.K. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
HUMAN RIGHTS & DEMOCRACY: THE 2010 FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE REPORT, RUSSIA,
available at http://fcohrdreport.readandcomment.com/human-rights-in-countries-of-concern/russia/.
59
For an excellent analysis of the context and provisions of the NGO law, see Robert C.
Blitt,‘Babushka Said Two Things—It Will Either Rain or Snow; It Either Will or Will Not’: An
Analysis of the Provisions and Human Rights Implications of Russia’s New Law on Non-Governmental
Organizations as Told Through Eleven Russian Proverbs,” 40 GEO. WASH. IN’TL L.REV. 1 (2008–
2009).
60
RUSSIA: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 2011, FREEDOM HOUSE, available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2011/russia; INAPPROPRIATE ENFORCEMENT OF
ANTI-EXTREMIST LEGISLATION IN RUSSIA IN A [SIC] FIRST HALF OF 2010 (Alexander Verkhovsky, ed.,
2010), available at http://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/reports-analyses/2010/10/d19880/.
61
Roman Muzalevsky, Russia’s Strategy in Central Asia: An Analysis of Key Trends, 4 Yale J.
Int’l Aff. 26 (2009); Dmitri Trenin, Russia Leaves the West 85 Foreign Affairs 92–93 (July-Aug.
2006).
62
Roman Muzalevsky, Russia’s Strategy in Central Asia: An Analysis of Key Trends, 4 YALE J.
INT’L AFF. 26 (2009).
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Shanghai Cooperation Organization (including Central Asia and China),
originally designed to rival the European Union.63 The “color”
revolutions in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004-5), and Kyrgyzstan (2005)
have unsettled Russia and its authoritarian Central Asian neighbors.64
The Western orientation of these former Soviet republics is troubling in
Russia—in contrast, Putin has proposed reuniting the former republics in
a new Eurasian Union, “a powerful supranational union capable of
becoming a pole of the modern world.”65
Religion has also been the victim of centralizing approaches.
Minority or break-off religions face repression or discrimination.66 In
many cases, dominant religions have become co-opted by the state.67
Whether by self-censorship or because of attempts to curry favor,
dominant religious leaders often endorse those in power and echo
political leaders’ self-serving statements.68 Government officials have
63

See generally Boris Gorshkov, Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Paradigm for
Geopolitical Determinism, 1 WORLD AFFAIRS REVIEW 1, 30 (Apr. 2006); Thomas Ambrosio, Catching
the ‘Shanghai Spirit’: How the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms in
Central Asia, in 60 EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES 1321 (2008),; Alexander Cooley, Cooperation Gets
Shanghaied: China, Russia, and the SCO, 88 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 6 (2009).
64
Dmitri Trenin, Russia Leaves the West 85 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 92–93 (July-Aug. 2006); Thomas
Carothers, The Backlash against Democracy Promotion, 85 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 55–57 (July-Aug 2006);
Thomas Ambrosio, Insulating Russia from a Colour Revolution: How the Kremlin Resists Regional
Democratic Trends, 14 DEMOCRATIZATION 232 (2007).
65
Ukraine, Russia and the Eurasian Union: Yulia Timoshenko’s Trials, THE ECONOMIST (15 Oct.
2011) available at http://www.economist.com/node/21532290.
66
See, e.g., Geraldine Fagan, Russia: State Restrictions on Mosques in South’s Minority Muslim
Areas, FORUM 18 (Nov. 9, 2004), available at http://forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=447;
Geraldine Fagan, Russia: Kalmykia’s “Common Defence” Against “Non-Traditional” Religions,
FORUM 18 (Apr. 15, 2003), available at http://forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=32; Felix Corley,
Turkmenistan: Religious Communities Theoretically Permitted, But Attacked in Practice?, FORUM 18
(Apr. 1, 2004), available at http://forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=293; Igor Rotar, Uzbekistan:
No Hope of Registration for Minority Faiths?, FORUM 18 (Mar. 12, 2003), available at
http://forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1; Mushfig Bayram, Kazakhstan: “To Prepare the Public
for a Discriminatory New Law,” FORUM 18 (Sept. 20, 2011), available at
http://forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1614.
67
See, e.g., Robert Crews’ discussion of Islam in Russia in RELIGION IN RUSSIAN SOCIETY: STATE
POLICY, REGIONAL CHALLENGES, AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 15 (F. Joseph Dresen, ed. 2008) , (“the
Russian state has approached Islam by trying to construct institutions, by cutting off transnational ties,
and by manipulating religious authority to validate state policies. It has also used these institutions to
try to conduct surveillance of the activities of mosque communities and personnel.”); See also Felix
Corley, Turkmenistan: State Officials’ Dual Role as Clergy to Suppress Freedom of Religion or Belief,
FORUM 18 (Oct. 13, 2009), available at http://forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1361.
68
Aleksei Sosedov, Presidential Candidate Vladimir Putin Visits Religious Leaders for a Blessing
and He Got It, INTERFAX-RELIGIA Feb. 2012), English translation available online at
http://www2.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/1202b.html#08; Head of Russian Pentecostals Compares
Putin to Solomon, INTERFAX-RELIGIA (Mar. 6, 2012), English translation available at
http://www2.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/1203b.html#05; Mikhail Moshkin, Church Considers
Faithful Loyal Voters: RPTsMP and other traditional confessions congratulate Putin on decisive
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intervened in the leadership of major denominations.69 “Putin has shown
that he likes to deal with religions, as with other social organizations,
along Soviet lines: through a single, pliable leader.”70 Religion has also
become part of Russian foreign policy: official diplomatic channels are
used to promote the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchy in
Ukraine against rival Orthodox groups.71

II.

Legislative Trends in Russia and Central Asia

The last few years have seen a flurry of restrictive laws affecting
religion in moderate Central Asia and Russia. In 2008 and 2009,
restrictive revisions of key religion laws were passed in Kazakhstan72 and
in the Kygyz Republic.73 The Kazak law was referred by their president
to Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Council, which held that the law was
unconstitutional.74 The law reappeared, however, with slight variations
and was passed again in October 2011 and signed by President
Nazarbayev, who chose not to refer it to the Constitutional Council.75 A
law which would limit proselyting was proposed by the Russian Ministry
victory, MOSKOVSKIE NOVOSTI (Mar. 5, 2012), English translation available at
http://www2.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/1203b.html#05.
69
Russia’s Muslims: Facing Extreme Prejudice, THE ECONOMIST (May 8, 2003) available at
http://www.economist.com/node/1768623 (citing examples from Russian intervention in the Jewish
and Muslim communities’ leadership).
70
Id.
71
See Robert C. Blitt, Russia’s 'Orthodox' Foreign Policy: The Growing Influence of the Russian
Orthodox Church in Shaping Russia’s Policies Abroad, 33 UNIV. PA. J. INT’L L. 363 (2011).
72
“Law on Amendments and Additions to Several legislative Acts on Questions of Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Associations” adopted 26 Nov. 2008, struck down by Constitutional Council
of Kazakhstan 11 February 2009. See Julia Dunn, Kazakhstan Backs Off on Religion Limits, THE
WASH. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/13/kazakhstan-reverses-law-to-restrict-minorityrelig/?page=all.
73
2009 Kyrgyz Law.
74
See, e.g., United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, USCIRF Annual
Report 2010 – Additional Countries Closely Monitored: Kazakhstan, Apr. 29, 2010,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4be2840b1a.html; Kazakhstan’s amendments to religion law
ruled unconstitutional, Interfax, Feb. 11, 2009, http://www.interfax-religion; Mushfig Bayram,
Kazakhstan: “The current Religion Law is also unconstitutional,” Forum18.org, Feb. 12, 2009,
http://www.forum18.
75
See, e.g., President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan,
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN, (Oct. 2011),
http://www.akorda.kz/en/news/decrees_orders_laws/2011/10/glava_gosudarstva_podpisal_zakon_resp
ubliki_kazahstan; Kazakhstan: New Law on Religion Enacted, LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, Oct. 17,
2011, http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news; Georgiy Voloshin, New law on religions in
Kazakhstan criticized by Muslims and NGOs, CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS INSTITUTE, (Oct. 19, 2011),
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5651.
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of Justice in 2009, but dropped after public opposition.76 In October
2011, the Russian Ministry of Justice proposed amendments to the 1997
law which would change registration requirements and codify the
allocation of broad powers to a body responsible for religious “expert”
opinions.77
Commenting on the 2011 Russian draft amendments to their religion
law, Andrey Sebentsov, executive secretary of the Russian Federation’s
governmental Commission for Religious Associations noted, “Whenever
we try to improve things, we manage to make them worse.”78 In many
ways, that sums up current legislative trends in Russia and Central Asia.
Recent years have seen a sharing of “worst practices,” as the more liberal
states in this region, such as Russia, Kazakhstan, and the Kyrgyz
Republic, have adopted or proposed approaches that track developments
from the more repressive countries, such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
and Tadjikistan. Dominant issues addressed by these laws include
registration, proselyting, the role of religious “expertise,” and censorship.
A. Registration Restrictions
“Registration” is largely akin to legal incorporation in the U.S., but in
the Soviet and post-Soviet world, registration laws have largely been
used as a control mechanism to regulate the existence and behavior of
religious organizations.79 Religious organizations may not obtain legal
entity status without registration,80 and in some cases may not operate at
all without registration81 or at least notification to the state.82
76

See Geraldine Fagan, Russia: Proposed Missionary Restrictions—A Paper Tiger?, FORUM 18
(Nov. 23, 2009), available at http://forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1378.
77
See, e.g., Russia tightens grip on religious groups, GAZETA, July 10, 2011,
http://en.gazeta.ru/news/2011/10/07/a_3793474.shtml; Legislative Analysis of Ministry of Justice
Proposed Amendments to 1997 Religion Law, INSTITUTE ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC POLICY, Nov. 1,
2011,
http://religionandpolicy.org/cms/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7203&Itemid=495
78
Facebook page, Alexander Verkhovsky, November 2011.
79
See, e.g., Sebastien Peyrouse, The Relationship between Church and State in the Post-soviet
World: The Case of Christianity in Central Asia, 49 J. CHURCH & ST. 97. 108 (2007) (“The most
common judicial measure [of controlling religious groups] consists of refusing the registration of
groups considered undesireable, even if they met all the necessary conditions.”).
80
See, e.g., Blitt, supra note 71; Perry L. Glanzer & Konstantin Petrenko, Religion and Education
in Post-communist Russia: Russia’s Evolving Church-State Relations, J. CHURCH & ST. 53, 54 n.7
(2007); Nathaniel Stinnett, Defining Away Religious Freedom in Europe: How Four Democracies Get
Away with Discriminating Against Minority Religions, B.C.INT’L & COMP. L. REV 429, 432 (2005).
81
See, e.g., David Galemba, The Authoritarian Roadblock on Post-Soviet Central Asia’s Long
Road to Religious Freedom, Rutgers J. of Law and Religion 1 (Spring 2007); Igor Rotar, Central Asia:
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Requirements for religious groups to register are generally more
restrictive than those for other non-profit organizations, and in some
cases involve or easily permit discriminatory decisions based on the
beliefs of the organization in question.83 Registration laws have been
described as “a key indicator of religious freedom.”84
1. Compulsory Registration
a. Legislative provisions
In recent years, compulsory registration of religious groups and an
accompanying ban on unregistered activity has extended from the more
repressive countries of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tadjikistan85 to
the Kyrgyz Republic86 and Kazakhstan.87 Bans on unregistered activity
are some of the most repressive measures possible, as the state not only
limits religious activity to groups of which it approves, but also, in many
cases, invokes criminal penalties for any other forms of religious
expression.88
State Policy Towards Religious Minorities in Central Asia, FORUM 18 (Jan. 21, 2004), available at
http://forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=233; Igor Rotar, Uzbekistan: New Hope for Religious
Communities to Get State Registration?, FORUM 18 (Apr. 26, 2004), available at
http://forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=305.
82
See Igor Rotar, Central Asia: State Policy Towards Religious Minorities in Central Asia,
FORUM 18 (Jan. 21, 2004), available at http://forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=233; Igor Rotar,
Kazakhstan: More Planned Restrictions on Religious Freedom, FORUM 18 (Feb. 21, 2007), available
at http://forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=916;
83
See, e.g., Irina G. Basova, Freedom under Fire: The New Russian Religious Law, Temp. Int’l &
Comp. L. J. 181 (2000); Wallace L. Daniel & Christopher Marsh, Russia’s 1997 Law on Freedom of
Conscience in Context and Retrospect, J. Church & St. 5, 8-10 (2007); Veronika V. Kravchouk, New
Religious Movements and the Problem of Extremism in Modern Russia, BYU L. REV. 507 (2004); R.
Christopher Preston, Islam in Russia Under the Federal Law on Freedom of Conscience and on
Religious Associations: Official Tolerance in an Intolerant Society, BYU L. REV. 773, 801 (2001).
84
Durham, W. Cole, Jr. Religious Association Laws and Facilitating Freedom of Religion or
Belief in FACILITATING FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: A DESKBOOK 326 (Linholm, T. et al., eds.
2004),.
85
See, e.g., Galemba, supra note 81 at 14-17; Sebastien Peyrouse, supra note 79, at 105-013.
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2009 Kyrgyz Law, Art. 11.
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2011 Kazakh Law, Art. 3.11.
88
See e.g. Felix Corley, Turkmenistan: Religious Freedom Survey, November 2010, FORUM 18,
(Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1512 (Individuals
participating in unregistered religious activity are subject to raids and fines in Turkmenistan);
Violations of Freedom Religion or Belief in Turkmenistan, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS; USCIRF
Annual Report 2011-Countries of Particular Concern: Uzbekistan, United States Commission on
International Religious Freedom, (Apr. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4dbe90bd4b.html (Uzbekistan Muslims failing to conform to
government standards have been subject to arrest.); Mushfig Bayram, Uzbekistan Legal Status Denials
and Unregistered Activity Fines Continue, FORUM 18, (Aug. 8, 2008), available at
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This extremely restrictive approach has reared its head in countries
that had generally been more tolerant.89 In 2009, the Kyrgyz Republic
adopted a law requiring registration of religious organizations and
missions of foreign religious organizations.90 The law also penalizes
individuals performing activities on behalf of an unregistered religious
organization91 and the “evasion of religious organizations from
registration with the state body for religious affairs.”92 Kazakhstan
followed suit in October 2011, also making registration compulsory and
banning unregistered activity.93 It had previously attempted this in its
2009 draft, which had been found to violate the religious freedom
protections in the Kazakh Constitution by Kazakhstan’s Constitutional
Council.94 Since the Kazakh Constitutional Council does not have direct
review and cases must be referred by one of several political leaders, it
appears highly unlikely that the Constitutional Council will have the
opportunity to review the 2011 law.
Russia on its face appears to be moving the other direction – recent
draft legislation proposes eliminating the notification requirement from
the 1997 law, i.e., that unregistered “groups” intending to become
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1169 (Courts in Uzbekistan routinely uphold fines
imposed on religious practitioners.); USCIRF Annual Report Report 2011-The Commission’s Watch
List: Tajikstan, UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, (Apr. 28,
2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,USCIRF,,,4dbe90b7c,0.html. (A Church,
synagogue, and three mosques were destroyed by the Tajik government and Jehovah’s Witnesses are
banned.); Mushfig Bayram, Tajikstan: Religious Freedom Survey March 2011, FORUM 18, (Mar. 17,
2011), available at http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1553 (Tajik government engaging
in human rights violations including arbitrary jailing of Muslims, destruction of religious buildings,
increased censorship, limitations on belief sharing, and a draft Parental Responsibility Law that bans
individuals under 18 from participating in religious activities.); Mushfig Bayram, Kyrgyzstan:
“Restore Religious Freedom at Least to the Level we had Before Bakiev, FORUM 18, (Apr. 16, 2010),
available at http://forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1432. (Action of the Kyrgyz government has
included a ban on unregistered religious activity and raids on worship meetings.); Mushfig Bayram,
Kazakhstan: Criminal Records for Religious Activity, FORUM 18, (Apr. 1, 2010), available at
http://forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1428. (Criminal penalties imposed by the Kazakhstan
government include fining a pastor engaged in prayer for the health of a parishioner and charging
religious drug rehabilitation centers with illegal detainment of patients.)
89
It has also been adopted in Belarus in 2002 and proposed in Armenia in 2011. “On Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Organisations,” Law of the Republic of Belarus (2002), Ch. 2, Art. 16-19;
Draft Law of the Republic of Armenia on Freedoms of Conscience and Religion (2011), Art. 6.1.
90
2009 Kyrgyz Law, Art. 9.
91
Id.
92
2009 Kyrgyz Law, Art. 11.
93
2011 Kazakh Law, Art. 3.11 (“Activity of religious associations not registered in the manner
established by law . . . is not allowed”).
94
See Mushfig Bayram, Kazakhstan: Religious freedom survey, FORUM 18, (Sept. 23, 2009),
available at http://forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1352.
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registered associations are required to report to the state.95 The 2011
draft does not explicitly ban unregistered activity, and so would appear to
liberalize the situation (i.e., unregistered groups now need not notify the
government). Some Russians have raised the concern that it is unlikely
that all bureaucrats enforcing the law would see it that way, given the
remnants of the Soviet mindset that “anything not permitted is strictly
prohibited.”96 From this point of view, elimination of the designation
“group” means that it is no longer a permissible organizational unit. A
few Russian commentators have argued that the next likely logical step
after elimination of “groups” would be to ban meetings of unregistered
organizations or any non-registered religious societies.97 Given the trend
in this region, the concerns are not without basis.
b. Evaluation with regards to international norms
Mandatory registration provisions and bans on unregistered activity
are very problematic; freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief “alone
or in community with others” forms the core element of international
protections of religious freedom.98 The European Court of Human Rights
has specifically rejected the attempt of a state to penalize individual
95

Russian Federation, Federal Law No. 125-FZ on the freedom of conscience and religious
association (1997), Art. 7.2.
96
Aleksandr Verkhovsky, “Попытка ыпорядочнения: Как можно понимать законопроект
Минюста” NARODNAYA GAZETA-RELIGII (16 Nov. 2011) (recognizing that some bureaucrats may
well misunderstand the law, but arguing that it is indeed a liberalizing measure).
97
See, e.g., Analysis of the Slavic Center for Law and Justice, Новая инициатива Министерства
юстиции РФ: больше вопросов, чем ответов (October 11, 2011), available at
http://www.sclj.ru/news/detail.php?SECTION_ID=260&ELEMENT_ID=3527; Letter of Guild of
Experts on Religion and Law to civil servants and believers on the amendments to the Federal law
from September 26, 1997, no. 125-F3 “On freedom of conscience and religious organizations,”
available at http://perchatkin.com/perchatkin/?p=4151.
98
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 217A (III) (10 December 1948) (hereinafter “Universal Declaration of Human
Rights), Art. 18; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted and opened for
signature by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 22000A (XXI) (16 Dec. 1966) (hereinafter
“ICCPR”), see Art. 18.1 (“right to thought, conscience and religion shall include “freedom, either
individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
worship, observance, practice or teaching”); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature by the Council of Europe (4 Nov. 1950) (hereinafter
“European Convention”), Art. 9 (“the right to freedom of though, conscience and religion includes the
freedom “either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief, in worship, teaching, practice, and observance”); Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe, Concluding Document of Madrid-The Second Follow-up Meeting, Madrid, (6 Sept. 1983),
“Questions Relating to Security in Europe,” para. 12 (OSCE member states will recognize, respect and
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members of a denomination for manifesting unregistered religious beliefs
as incompatible with the European Convention.99 No state in the
Western Hemisphere or Europe requires mandatory registration of
religious organizations except Cuba and Belarus.100
While most religious organizations seek legal entity status, there are
some individuals and groups that object to state registration either as a
matter of belief101 or of religious judgment as to what is most convenient
in administering the affairs of a small group. These groups should not be
required to register in order to be able to practice their beliefs. Limiting
their right to manifest religious beliefs is disproportionate and not
necessary in a democratic society. “Any legitimate concerns a state may
have in registration (such as being aware of the existence of religious
groups in society or of who represents religious groups in public settings)
can be sufficiently met by notice requirements (as opposed to statecontrolled registration requirements) that do not confer on government
the right to curtail religious practice.”102
Bans on unregistered activity also as a practical matter make it
impossible for a new group to form legally or for existing groups to
expand beyond the jurisdiction in which they are registered—gaining the
number of adherents required to register and making the decision to
register themselves require unregistered religious activity. The
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, together with the
Council of Europe’s Venice Commission have produced Guidelines for
Review of Legislation Pertaining to Religion or Belief, which make it
clear that “[i]ndividuals and groups should be free to practice their
religion without registration if they so desire”; “[r]egistration of religious
organizations should not be mandatory per se, although it is appropriate
to require registration for the purposes of obtaining legal personality and
similar benefits.”103
99

Masaev v. Moldova, No. 6303/05, Eur. Ct. HR (12 May 2009).
July-December 2010, International Religious Freedom Report: Cuba, BUREAU OF
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European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), adopted by the Venice
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2. Increase in registration requirements
a. Legislative provisions
Concomitant with mandatory registration provisions are significant
increases in registration requirements, both in minimum number of
members and in length of time the organization has operated in the
country.
The 2009 Kyrgyz Law increased the requirement of minimum number
of members for local religious organizations to register from 10 to 200.104
To establish a central administrative body, religious organizations must
act in at least 9 regions of the Kyryz Republic.105 To establish a religious
association (which is not clearly distinguished from a religious
organization or a central administrative body), the association “must have
at least ten religious communities of a common denomination, of which
at least one has been operating in the Kyrgyz Republic for no less than
fifteen years.”106
In 2011, Kazakhstan increased the number of members required from
10 to 50 for local organizations, 500 for regional, and 5,000 for national
organizations.107
The Russian 2011 draft amendments take a more nuanced approach.
They do not eliminate the division between local organizations, which
require 10 members to form, and centralized organizations, which require
3 local organizations.108 They do, however, eliminate the 1997 law’s
requirement that centralized organizations have been operating in the
country for at least fifteen years.109 This implemented the European
Court of Human Rights decision from 2009, Kimlya v. Russia, in which
the Court held that the 15-year requirement violated Russia’s religious
freedom obligations under the European Convention.110
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The draft amendments, however, do not entirely abandon the idea of
using years of operation in the country; the amendments propose
restricting the rights of local organizations which are not connected with
centralized religious organizations or that have not been registered for ten
or more years. These local religious organizations may not exercise
various rights of other associations: tax privileges, financial support, and
support of teaching general educational subjects in religious educational
institutions;111 representation of a foreign religious organization;112
conducting religious rites in hospitals, homes for children and the elderly,
and correctional facilities;113 creating educational organizations and mass
media;114 creating institutions of professional religious education;115
inviting foreign citizens for professional activity.116
b.

Evaluation with regards to international norms

Making distinctions among groups to receive additional state benefits,
as the Russian draft appears to do, is fairly typical among cooperationist
regimes like those in many European countries117 and meets international
standards so long as the distinctions are proportionate and “necessary in a
democratic society.”118 Any attempts to have high minimum membership
or length of time requirements for base legal entity status, however,
violate international norms on religious freedom.119
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COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS art. 9, cl. 2 (2010), available
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The U.N. Human Rights Committee, interpreting the religious
freedom protections of Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights has stated that “Article 18 is not limited in its
application to traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with
institutional characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional
religions. The Committee therefore views with concern any tendency to
discriminate against any religion or belief for any reasons, including the
fact that they are newly established, or represent religious minorities that
may be the subject of hostility by a predominant religious community.” 120
Reasonable access to legal entity status is a core part of religious
freedom.121 The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly
emphasized that the right of religious freedom in light of the freedom of
association involves reasonable access to legal entity status: “one of the
means of exercising the right to manifest one’s religion, especially for a
religious community, in its collective dimension, is the possibility of
ensuring judicial protection of the community, its members and assets . .
.”122 Toleration of unregistered groups by the state is no substitute for
reasonable access to registration “since recognition alone is capable of
conferring rights on those concerned.”123
Best practice in the OSCE region also suggests small minimum
membership—“the overwhelming majority [of OSCE countries] have
minimum member requirements of 10 or less.”124 The OSCE/ODIHR
Guidelines on Legislation explain that “[h]igh minimum membership
requirements [should] not be allowed with respect to obtaining legal
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personality,” and “[i]t is not appropriate to require lengthy existence in
the State before registration is permitted.”125
This reflects a clear understanding of freedom of religion and freedom
of association requirements and respect for the various organizational
structures of religious organizations. Some organizations, as a matter of
belief, are structured congregationally instead of hierarchically, which
results in a smaller number of members.126 The reduced minimum
membership requirements properly prevent discrimination against
congregationally structured religious organizations.
B. Restrictions on Proselyting
1. Context
Restrictions on proselyting result from numerous negative attitudes
and concerns about groups that engage in proselyting. For example,
many Russians see missionary activity as primarily a foreign endeavor
and reject it on nationalistic grounds.127 Alarmist media reports often
describe foreign missionaries as spies.128 In many ways this parallels the
accusations Putin’s government made that the protests following the
elections of December 2011 were fomented by foreigners trying to
undermine the government. As early as 2000, Putin’s government
adopted a policy paper on national security which had a chapter on
“spiritual security” and the importance of controlling missionary
activity.129
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Another basis for the legislative reaction against proselyting in this
region comes from a strong tradition that religion functions primarily as a
cultural and ethnic marker—the assumption that to be truly “Russian,”
ethnic Russians must be Orthodox or that ethnic Kazakhs or Kyrgyz must
of necessity be Muslim.130 The Russian government often makes
reference to the four “traditional” religions in Russia—Russian
Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism, but ignores other, nonethnically divided religions, such as Protestantism, that have been in the
country for over two hundred years.131
2. Legislative provisions
Restrictions on proselyting are one of the most common forms of
restriction of religion in recent years in Russia and Central Asia.132 The
2009 Kyrgyz law prohibited “all actions directed to proselytizing of the
faithful from one denomination to another . . . as well as any other illegal
missionary work,”133 but failed to define “illegal” missionary work.
The Russian government proposed a ban on missionary activity in
2006 and again in 2009.134 The original 2006 proposal required
missionaries to notify the state of an intent to conduct missionary activity
and to carry permission to preach. It also banned proselyting in hospitals
or within 100 meters of religious building of another denomination, as
well as missionary activity directed at minors or “people who are
experiencing difficult life situations and involving any promise to help
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them resolve such a situation.”135 This exceptionally broad sweep would
significantly restrict freedom of speech and religion.
The 2009 proposal was slightly narrower, but still significantly limited
proselyting activity. According to the draft law, any missionary activity
would have to be authorized by the religious association being promoted
unless it took place on sites belonging to a religious association. Also,
foreign citizens would need religious work visas to proselyte, defined as
“activity by a religious association aimed at disseminating its doctrines
among persons who are not members, participants or followers of the
given religious association, with the aim of drawing the said persons into
the religious association, and conducted directly, publicly, through mass
media or other legal means by religious associations or persons
authorised by them.”136 Under the draft law, proselyting could not be
accompanied by “material, social or other benefits” or “psychological
pressure”— all vague terms with the potential for discriminatory
application.137 Finally, religious organizations would not be permitted to
have non-member minors in their meetings without parental
permission.138
Kazakhstan, as part of the 2011amendments to its religion law, passed
restrictive proselyting restrictions that track the 2006 Russian draft in
large part, except that they add the requirement that anyone proselyting
must register annually with the state, which may review their religious
beliefs and materials.139 Proselyting is barred in buildings of state bodies,
the armed forces, schools, prisons, hospitals, and other state buildings.140
This provision has led to the wholesale removal of chaplaincy programs
and prayer rooms from prisons, hospitals, and other state buildings.141
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3. Evaluation with regards to international norms
Communication of religious messages is a core part of both freedom
of speech and freedom of religion.142 Religious persuasion, advocacy,
and proselytism are often sensitive issues. In a limited set of
circumstances, these expressive activities may be in tension with the
rights and freedoms of others, but the Russian and Central Asian laws
and draft laws discussed above excessively restrict religious freedom and
freedom of speech. The European Court of Human Rights has
recognized that religious freedom under Article 9 of the European
Convention includes “‘the right to manifest [one’s] religion,’ including
the right to try to convince one’s neighbor, for example, through
‘teaching,’” but that religious freedom “does not, however, protect every
act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief.”143
While some language in European Court cases seems to indicate that
religious freedom may not protect some forms of proselytism, such as the
“offering of material or social advantage or the application of improper
pressure with a view to gaining new members for a church,”144 it is
important to note that the only restrictions of proselytism that the
European Court has actually upheld are those that penalized members of
the armed forces from repeatedly approaching a subordinate, “in view in
particular of the special character of the relationship between a superior
and subordinate in the armed forces . . .”145
The proper approach is to focus specifically on acts constituting
coercion. The OSCE/ODHIR Guidelines for Review of Legislation
Pertaining to Religion or Belief, for example, focus on actual coercion:
“If legislation operates to constrain missionary work, the limitation can
only be justified if it involves coercion or conduct or the functional
equivalent thereof in the form of fraud that would be recognized as such
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regardless of the religious beliefs involved.”146 Issues of coercion,
violence, or fraud are typically already penalized in existing law, thus
eliminating the need for specific provisions dealing with religious
coercion, religious violence, or religious fraud. Leaving religious
coercion, violence, and fraud to the existing criminal law instead of
creating separate offenses is the approach of most democratic systems.
The draft laws and legal limitations on proselytism discussed above
reach beyond coercion, fraud, and violence, and intrude on the right to
have or adopt beliefs, which is protected unconditionally in international
law. It is well-settled that whereas “manifestations” of religion may be
subject to a carefully restricted set of limitations,147 the internal freedom
of thought, conscience and religion—the so-called “forum internum”—
may not be limited. As the U.N. Human Rights Committee has
formulated this doctrine,
Article 18 distinguishes the freedom of thought, conscience, religion
or belief from the freedom to manifest religion or belief. It does not
permit any limitations whatsoever on the freedom of thought and
conscience or on the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of
one’s choice. These freedoms are protected unconditionally, as is the
right of everyone to hold opinions without interference in article
19(1).148
It is worth noting that over the years, many religious groups have
helped draft codes of missionary conduct in an effort to provide
appropriate self-regulation in this sphere.149 As a general matter, such
codes suggest a variety of “best practices,” but it is important that
practices that go beyond what is required by international human rights
146
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standards should be voluntary. Coercive state measures that
inappropriately limit religious persuasion are as problematic as any other
form of restrictions on expression rights.
In the draft laws and law discussed above, the definitions of
impermissible proselytism are overly broad, thus impinging on the
unconditional freedom of belief. In addition, these provisions are so
vague that they do not give sufficient notice of what behavior is illegal.
The European Court of Human Rights has held that limitations on
religious freedom may not be so vague that they do not give fair notice or
allow for arbitrary enforcement.150
For example, barring proselytism with “material, social or other
benefits” or “psychological pressure,” (in the 2009 Russian draft law) or
proselytism “directed at people who are experiencing difficult life
situations and involving any promise to help them resolve such a
situation” (in the 2006 Russian draft law)151 are excessively vague.
What one may see as a statement of conviction about sinful activity or
the wrongness of other beliefs or as extremely eager attempts to share
one’s beliefs might be portrayed by others as “psychological pressure.”
Certainly, one man’s enthusiastic zeal is another man’s fanaticism.
“Difficult life situations” could be found in most lives. Vagueness not
only creates notice problems, but also presents opportunities for abuse
and discrimination in enforcement, particularly in countries without a
strong tradition of rule of law such as Russia and Central Asia.152
Merely speaking words others find distasteful should not be banned.
The European Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that
“[a]lthough . . . it is possible that tension is created in situations where a
religious or any other community becomes divided, . . . this is one of the
unavoidable consequences of pluralism. The role of the authorities in
such circumstances is not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating
150
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pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each other . .
. .”153
The provisions on psychological pressure draw on a largely
discredited approach.154 Social scientists generally reject the idea of
“brainwashing”155 and many courts have rejected this as a defense to
forcible “deprogramming.”156 Ironically, the term “brainwashing” itself
arose from fears of what Communist leaders were able to do to their
citizens.157
Other vague and overbroad provisions in the proselyting provisions
cited above include the restrictions on advocacy by provision of material
or social benefits. Many religions provide material assistance to their
needy members and to others.158 This form of humanitarian and
charitable work is found in virtually all religions159 and constitutes a
considerable benefit that religions confer on society. What is normal and
laudable charitable service provided by one group may be
mischaracterized and criticized as improper proselyting by members of
other religious denominations, even though the charitable service is
rendered without intent or expectation of conversion. Does giving new
members access to benefits equally available to all members of that
religion constitute “providing material or social advantage”? With vague
153
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terms, it is unclear how provision of legitimate charitable assistance can
be distinguished from abusive material inducements or how
discriminatory enforcement can be avoided. The state has a legitimate
interest in addressing coercion or fraud, but otherwise, it should
encourage the charitable activity of religious groups, and should avoid
imposing criminal or administrative liability that could lead members of
less popular groups to fear prosecution for their charitable efforts.
The 2006 Russian draft law creates even more problems by penalizing
promises to “help [individuals] resolve [a difficult life] situation.”160
Religious organizations regularly promise that individuals will receive
non-tangible spiritual benefits, such as benefits in the next life, from
listening to their advocacy or joining their organizations.161 The
proposed draft law is worded broadly enough to include even these as
impermissible benefits. As demonstrated by the European Court’s
decision in Larissis, penal or administrative sanctions for religious
persuasion and missionary work should be permitted only in the context
of coercive relationships, such as persons acting as a representative of the
state, military superiors, employers, or where fraud has substantially
similar effects.162
The restrictions on proselyting to children without their parents’
consent in the Russian 2006 and 2009 draft laws and the ban on
“involvement of minors into religious organizations”163 in the 2009
Kyrygz law are also excessively restrictive. Parents do, of course, have
the right to direct their children’s exercise of religious freedom in
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connection with the “evolving capabilities of the child.”164 However,
these laws create a strange situation where individuals may freely speak
to children about atheism or extreme political views without their
parents’ consent, but violate the law when they speak about religious
beliefs. Mature minors also have rights to religious freedom165 and
freedom to receive information.166
Also, allowance should be made for the fact that teenagers sometimes
initiate interaction with members of other faiths. For example, a pastor
should not be held liable for violating the child-protection provisions
merely because a teenager walks into a service during a sermon or
attends a youth activity. The 2011 Kazak law is comparably more
reasonable, only requiring “the head of a religious association to take
measures to prevent involvement and/or participation of juveniles in
activity of a religious association in case of objection of one of the
parents or their legal representatives.”167
C. Religious Expertise
1. Legislative Provisions
Another significant trend in legislation affecting religion in Russia
and Central Asia is the troubling use of the term “religious expertise” or
“religious studies expertise.”168 These laws and draft laws grant
significant executive decision-making power to a group of designated
“experts” who may determine if a group is religious, is dangerous, or is
“extremist,”—determinations that result in a refusal to register a group, a
group’s de-registration, or the banning of a group’s literature.169 Some
of this practice stems from the Soviet-era view of the control functions of
state agencies: registration is still often seen in this part of the world as a
means for protecting society from undesirable groups.170 Even after the
164
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liberalizing legislation of the post-Soviet era, this function continued to
be performed by Departments of Religious Affairs in countries with these
government offices.171 In Russia, registration has been under the
auspices of the Ministry of Justice, but the 1997 Russian religion law
permitted it to conduct a state expert analysis by scholars of religion as
part of review of applications.172
To some extent, this use of scholarly expertise is fairly innocuous—
Western governments also occasionally consult scholars on questions
requiring expertise in religious studies.173 The concern raised by recent
legislation and practice in Russia and Central Asia, however, is that
significant executive power has been delegated to these bodies, which
have been staffed with representatives of dominant religious groups
instead of recognized scholars.174 These “expert councils” or government
religious affairs offices are given authority to review the legitimacy of all
organizations upon registration or in some cases upon their own
initiative.175 None of the recent draft laws or laws in Russia or laws in
Central Asia provides criteria for evaluations or limitations on what bases
may be used.176 The placement of representatives of dominant religious
171
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traditions and non-scholars on these councils or in these offices increases
the likelihood that these bodies will make uneducated judgments that
discriminate against minority groups.
Kyrgyzstan’s 2009 law and Kazakhstan’s 2011amendments introduce
a “religious study examination” to review religious registration
applications.177 In Kazakhstan, the examination, “carried out by persons
holding special knowledge in the field of religious studies, with the
assistance, when necessary of representatives from government bodies
and other professionals,”178 is also required in a broad array of situations:
upon request of natural or legal persons, application of religious
organizations or missionaries for registration, or upon the initiative of the
government agency for religious affairs.179 This review is also explicitly
combined with censorship—the government agency responsible for
religious affairs is required to conduct this examination to review all
religious materials before they can be imported, distributed, or placed in
state libraries.180
A prime example of some of these concerns is that of Russia, where
the religious examination is used to investigate the activity, doctrines,
leadership decisions, literature and worship of any registered
organization.181 The 2011 Russian law proposed codification of an
earlier order of the Ministry of Justice creating the Russian Council for
Conducting State Religious Expert Analysis.182 In April 2009, the
members of the Expert Council were appointed, with few academics and
many representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church who have made a
name for themselves by opposing and labeling non-Orthodox groups as
cults.183 The chair of the Expert Council is Alexander Dworkin, an antihttp://www.osce.org/odihr/82925; Felix Corley, Kyrgyzstan: President’s Signing of Restrictive
Religion Law Condemned, FORUM 18 (Jan. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1240.
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cult activist,184 who has described the faith of charismatic Protestants as
“a crude magical-occult system with elements of psychological
manipulation”185 and supported the Moscow’s deregistration of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses,186 which has been rejected by the European Court
of Human Rights.187 The Expert Council at this point is a part-time body
and has not been very active. It has, however, been on the cusp of an
extremely worrying trend of using Russia’s anti-extremism legislation to
prosecute religious minorities, particularly Jehovah’s Witnesses.188
Local expert councils have been formed in cities and regions around
Russia, and prosecutions have been brought for extremism against
Jehovah’s Witnesses, followers of the Turkish theologian Said Nursi, and
other Muslims.189 Prosecutions have been brought to banned a wide
range of materials as “extremist” including the Jehovah’s Witnesses’
Awake!; the Hare Krishna’s Baghavad-Gita As It Is; a Jehovah’s Witness
children’s book about Jesus, Learn from the Great Teacher; a picture
showing Mickey Mouse preaching the Sermon on the Mount in The
Journey of Mickey Mouse in the History of Art; and the “staple [Islamic]
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religious text” The Personality of a Muslim.190 The Russian Ministry of
Justice has developed a list of over one thousand federally banned
publications; it is essentially impossible to appeal the decision to put an
item on the list.191
The 2011 Russian draft amendments would codify and expand
existing federal practice, allowing evaluation of the “religious character”
of the organization and the trustworthiness of the data concerning the
basics of its religious doctrine and corresponding practice during
registration.192 The expert council is also supposed to give an opinion if
changes are made to an organization’s charter that are related to changed
evidence of beliefs, or if “changes in activity warrant investigation.”193
The 2011 draft would also give the Expert Council authority to
investigate whether religious organizations follow the laws of the
Russian federation, a power previously reserved to prosecutors’
offices.194 There are no limitations placed on how religious organizations
are evaluated or what bases for evaluation are permissible or
impermissible.195
These provisions are particularly problematic given the widespread
abuse of anti-extremism provisions in Russia against minority religious
groups. The Russian Supreme Court has recognized this problem, and in
June 2011, issued a resolution 196 condemning non-objective prosecutions
190
See Geraldine Fagan, Russia: The Battle With “Religious Extremism”—A Return to Past
Methods?, FORUM 18 (Apr. 28, 2009), available at http://forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1288;
Geraldine Fagan, Russia: Islamic Book Promoting Tolerance Banned, FORUM 18 (Feb. 1, 2008),
available at http://forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1080; Felix Corley, Russia: “This Isn’t About
Freedom of Conscience or Censorship,” FORUM 18 (Dec. 2, 2011), available at
http://forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1642; “Misuse of Anti-Extremism in February 2012,”
available at http://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/news-releases/2012/03/d23831/.
191
Министерство юстиции Российской Федерации [Ministry of Justice], Федеральный список
экстремистских материалов [Federalist List of Extremist Materials] (2011), available at
http://www.minjust.ru/nko/fedspisok/. As of April 3, 2012, 1,132 works had been placed on the
Federal List of Extremist Materials. Id. See also SOVA Ctr. for Information and Analysis, The SOVA
Center’s Talking Points for the EU/Russian Federation Human Rights Consultations, MISUSE OF ANTIEXTREMISM (May 29, 2009), available at http://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/conferencepapers/2009/05/d16124/.
192
2011 Russia Draft Law, Art. 11.
193
Id.
194
Id..See Slavic Legal Center, “Новое инизиатива Министерсва юстиции РФ: больше
вопросов, чем отеветов”(11 Oct. 2011), available at
http://www.sclj.ru/news/detail.php?SECTION_ID=260&ELEMENT_ID=3527.
195
See 2011 Russia Draft Law.
196
Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 11, “Concerning
Judicial Procedure in Criminal Cases of Crimes of Extremism” (June 28, 2011), available at

35

of “extremism” crimes against individuals having no motive to incite
hatred or enmity.197 Russian human rights commentators, however, have
expressed “doubts that its approval will bear immediate fruit. So far, we
see that regional courts are simply ignoring the Supreme Court’s
directions.”198 At present, the bulk of the problem has been regional
religious expert councils, prosecutors, and courts, but the 2011 legislation
would expand the scope of the Federal Expert Council and set a
problematic precedent of a national expert council with no restrictions on
the nature or basis of its evaluations and appears. Passage of the draft
legislation also would appear to endorse the existing council, with its
strong denominational and anti-minority slant.
2. Evaluation with respect to international
norms
By not providing standards for expert review of religious
organizations, the 2011 Russian draft, like the Kazakh and Kyrgyz laws
before it, is excessively vague and opens the way for substantive reviews
of religious beliefs, which would clearly violate international norms.199
As the European Court of Human Rights has explained, “The right to
freedom of religion or belief as guaranteed under the Convention
excludes any discretion on the part of the State to determine whether
religious beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs are
legitimate.”200
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The U.N. Human Rights Committee, in interpreting the religious
freedom protections of Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights has outlined similar standards. It has explained that:
Article 18 is not limited in its application to traditional religions or
to religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or
practices analogous to those of traditional religions. The
Committee therefore views with concern any tendency to
discriminate against any religion or belief for any reasons,
including the fact that they are newly established, or represent
religious minorities that may be the subject of hostility by a
predominant religious community.201

D. Censorship
1. Legislative provisions
Another worrying trend is the imposition of censorship of religious
materials. Central Asian countries have imposed considerable prior
restraint on any publication or importation of religious materials. The
2011 Kazakh law, for example, requires the government agency in charge
of religious affairs to review all religious materials before they are
distributed by missionaries, imported (except for personal use), or placed
in state libraries.202 Distribution of any materials with religious content is
only permitted in religious buildings, religious educational institutions or
“specifically identified stationary facilities identified by local executive
bodies of oblasts [regions].”203
Similarly, the 2009 Kyrgyz law imposes censorship over religious
materials and control over their distribution. Examination by a “state
religious expert” is required before material can be imported, distributed,
or placed in state libraries.204 Distribution of religious materials and
media is limited to sites owned by religious organizations “as well as in
places allocated for these purposes in the standard procedure by local
201
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governmental institutions.”205 Distribution of religious media is banned
in public places, in “visits to private apartments, children’s institutions,
schools, and higher education institutions.”206 Citizens and religious
organizations are only permitted to purchase and use religious literature
and “materials of religious orientation” only in places of worship and “in
specialized shops.”207
2.

Evaluation with respect to international

norms
These provisions clearly violate international norms on freedom of
speech and religion. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides that “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers.”208 Article 19 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights recognizes that the exercise of free speech
rights “carries with it special duties and responsibilities and may
therefore be subject to certain limitations, but these shall only be such as
are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For the respect of the rights or
reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of
public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.”209
The U.N. Human Rights Committee has explicitly noted that freedom
of expression, as protected in Article 19 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, includes religious discourse.210 To limit this
right, states “must demonstrate in specific and individualized fashion the
precise nature of the threat, and the necessity and proportionality of the
specific action taken, in particular by establishing a direct and immediate
connection between the expression and the threat.”211 Concerns for
national security from extremist-based violence are too broad and
disproportionate from the sweeping ban seen in the Kazakh law. In any
205
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case, religious manifestations (unlike speech rights generally) may not be
limited based on national security: the U.N. Human Rights Committee
has explained that “restrictions are not allowed on grounds not specified
[in Article 18], even if they would be allowed as restrictions to other
rights protected in the Covenant, such as national security.”212
Commitments made as a part of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe include ones that “states will . . . allow religious
faiths, institutions and organizations to produce, import and disseminate
religious publications and materials”213 and “respect the rights of
individual believers and communities of believers to acquire, possess,
and use sacred books, religious publications in the language of their
choice and other articles and materials related to the practice of religion
or belief.”214 Similarly, states have committed to “ensure that
individuals can freely choose their sources of information. In this context
they will . . . allow individuals, institutions, and organizations, while
respecting intellectual property rights, including copyright, to obtain,
possess, reproduce and distribute information of all kinds.”215 The 2011
Kazakh law and 2009 Kyrgyz law violate all of these commitments.
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The breadth of censorship imposed by these laws brings to mind the
U.N. Human Rights Committee’s comment that restrictions on freedom
of expression “may not put in jeopardy the right itself. The Committee
recalls that the relation between right and restriction and between norm
and exception must not be reversed.”216
III.

Conclusion

The troubling trend of legislation seeking to limit religious freedom in
Russia and Central Asia, although formidable, is not inevitable or
unstoppable. Other former Soviet states have adopted or proposed
legislation much more conducive to religious freedom. In Ukraine, for
example, various drafts have been proposed in recent years that generally
facilitate religious freedom.217 Armenia has proposed a law to resolve
problems facing conscientious objectors to military service218 and has
proposed amendments that would reduce the number of members for
registration and legal entity status from 200 to 25.219
Concerns about rule of law and political uncertainties, however, add a
level of uncertainty to even positive legislative innovations. In Ukraine,
for example, resurrection of the comparatively innocuous 2006 draft law
necessary steps to ensure the basic conditions for (…) unimpeded transborder and intra-State flow of
information(…).”).
216
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has been strenuously opposed by the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches
not because of the content, but because of concerns that when the draft
goes to parliament that more restrictive provisions would be added.220
The absence of effective protest against authoritarian trends in Russia
and Central Asia also suggest that change may not come quickly. The
so-far-limited success of protests against unfair elections in Russia
starting December 2011 is symptomatic of the strong hold that the
government has over civil society and public opinion.221
Another issue of concern is the increasingly limited attempts of Russia
and Central Asian countries to burnish their human-rights credentials.
Kazakhstan, for example, campaigned extensively for chairmanship of
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, which it
gained in 2010.222 The referral of the restrictive 2009 Kazakh draft law
to the Constitutional Council, which struck it down, can be seen as part
of the Kazakh leadership’s attempt to portray its image as a defender of
human rights. After the chairmanship of the OSCE rotated on to other
countries in 2011, Kazakhstan promptly adopted an even more repressive
version of the 2009 Draft law. Russia has also made limited attempts to
win approval of its human rights record. For example, it still has not
implemented a 2010 religious freedom decision of the European Court of
Human Rights.223 With Putin’s election as president in March 2012,
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beginning what appears to be another twelve years of assured position,
many Russians concerned about religious freedom and human rights are
concerned that increasingly restrictive measures will be adopted there.
Absent extreme regime changes, the decline of liberalism in Russia and
moderate Central Asia seems unstoppable for the foreseeable future.
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